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Methods for Multicountry Studies of Corporate Governance 
(and Evidence from the BRIKT Countries)* 
© 2013 Bernard S. Black. All rights reserved. 
 
Abstract.  We discuss the perils in multicountry studies of corporate governance (CG), focusing on 
emerging markets.  The existing studies are massively multicountry studies, which cover many firms 
across many countries, but rely on the same limited governance elements in each countries, have 
few firm-level control variables, and use pure-cross-sectional data.  This paper discusses the severe 
data and construct validity issues in these studies, proposes methods to respond to those issues, and 
applies those methods through a study of five major emerging markets (Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, 
and Turkey).  We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country.  We address 
construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions.  
These similar-but-not-identical indices predict higher firm market value, both in each country and 
when pooled across countries.  In contrast, a “common index” that uses the same elements in each 
country, has no predictive power.  Firm fixed effects results differ substantially from cross-sectional 
or pooled OLS, and firm random effects.  Results are also sensitive to choice of control variables 
(strongly so with the weaker cross-sectional and pooled OLS specifications), and to the functional 
form for the dependent variable and how one addresses outliers. 
 
Keywords:  Brazil, Korea, India, Russia, Turkey, corporate governance, boards of directors, 
disclosure, shareholder rights. 
JEL codes:  G18, G30, G34, G39, K22, K29 
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1 – Introduction 
We study here the empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effect of firm-level 
corporate governance on firm market value, focusing on emerging markets, and propose methods to 
respond to those challenges.1  For many topics in corporate finance, the US, UK, and a few other 
developed countries provide an adequate “laboratory”: a large sample of public companies, good financial 
disclosure, and time series data.  For corporate governance, however, one cannot infer cross-country 
regularities by studying one or two countries, nor understand governance in emerging markets by 
studying developed ones.2  The aspects of corporate governance that are likely to affect firm value also 
depend on prevailing legal rules and other institutions, which vary widely across countries. 
When studying corporate governance in emerging markets, especially across markets, we need to 
confront an array of problems.  A central issue is “construct validity” – a term we borrow from education 
and psychology (see Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002, for an overview).  A governance index is a 
construct that imperfectly measures unobserved underlying governance.  There is no direct way to 
quantify the gap between the construct and the underlying concept.  Moreover, what matters in 
governance often depends on local norms and institutions; thus, the same construct may fit underlying 
governance well in some countries but poorly in others. 
A second core problem is lack of data on governance, especially lack of consistent, time series 
data across countries.  Lack of data on governance also reinforces concerns with construct validity.  As 
we will show, it is impossible to use public data to build a broad governance index based on common 
elements, even across the five countries we study.  It is nearly impossible to do so even relying on private 
surveys of firms (as we do in Brazil, India, and Korea).  If we try, the best index we can build predicts 
almost nothing.   
A third problem is endogeneity.  Natural experiments can sometimes be found in individual 
countries, but address limited aspects of governance.  The next best approach, and the one we pursue 
here, is to build panel data and use firm fixed (or at least random) effects, plus extensive control variables, 
to limit one central endogeneity concern, omitted variable bias (OVB).  Yet, both time-series data on 
                                                 
1  We put aside the effects of country-level governance – the “LLSV and all that” line of research on how country 
level governance affects capital markets and economic performance.  See, e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b); 
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001); Levine and Zervos (1998). 
2  In the US and UK, a dominant concern is whether the firm is well managed.  Many firms are widely held, so 
takeover defenses are central in measuring governance (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell, 2009).  In emerging markets, most firms have a control group, making takeover defenses irrelevant. A 
major concern is limiting self-dealing by controllers (e.g., Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004). 
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governance and rich data on control variables are hard to come by.  Narrow measures of governance that 
focus on, say, board independence or disclosure, face additional problems.  Different aspects of 
governance often correlate.  The omitted aspects of governance are a source of OVB for the included 
aspects.  Narrower measures also exacerbate construct validity concerns.  Finally, in many countries, the 
number of firms with governance data is limited.  Sometimes, financial databases are imperfect. 
Yet, most what we think we know about the relation between corporate governance and market 
value in emerging markets comes from studies with most or all of these problems.  The literature contains 
two principal strategies: single country studies (“deep and narrow”) and studies that pool firms across 
many countries (“massively multicountry”).  Deep and narrow studies can overcome some of these 
problems, but suffer from limited sample sizes and lack of generalizability. Massively multicountry 
studies can provide reasonable sample sizes and potentially offer generalizability, but to date, have failed 
to address the remaining obstacles.3 
In this article we describe the perils in multicountry studies of corporate governance, and seek to 
make progress on all three core dimensions:  construct validity, data on governance and control variables, 
and endogeneity.  We construct, largely by hand, unique time-series datasets on governance in each of 
five important emerging markets – Brazil, Russia, India, Korea, and Turkey (“BRIKT” countries).4  
Together, these countries provide a representative sample of the results one might expect in moderately 
developed emerging markets.  They differ in many ways, including legal traditions, language, culture, 
geographic location, and background legal rules.  Our governance dataset covers many but far from all 
public firms in each country.  It is, we believe, close to the best that one can realistically build across 
multiple emerging markets.5  We use this rich dataset, plus extensive control variables:  (1) to explore 
how each of the above methods weaknesses affects results; and (2) offer a more robust approach to 
understanding how corporate governance affects firm value in emerging markets. 
We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and 
institutions.  Each is comprised (data permitting) of subindices for board structure, board procedure, 
disclosure, ownership structure, minority shareholder rights, and control of related party transactions.  
Each subindex is comprised of one or more “elements” that seek to capture specific aspects of governance 
                                                 
3  Studies using this approach include Durnev and Kim (2005); Klapper and Love (2004); Dahya, Dimitrov, and 
McConnell (2008) (board independence); Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007).  Developed market studies using this 
approach include Aggarwal et al. (2009). 
4  This is a play on the World Bank’s use of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as key emerging markets.  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC.  Some would add Turkey.  We do not study China because the heavy dominance 
of state-controlled firms in China means that generalizability is suspect, and study Korea instead. 
5  At least short of a World Bank scale multicountry project, with substantial funding for data collection. 
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that we consider relevant in each country.  The indices and subindices for each country are broadly 
similar, and seek to capture similar underlying governance concepts.  But the individual elements reflect 
the norms, institutions, and data limitations in each country. 
As an example of the problems with using only common elements across countries, consider an 
audit committee.  These committees are often thought to be a useful component of board structure.  They 
might in fact be valuable – but we can’t measure their value in India and Turkey, where they are required, 
nor in Russia, where board committees are formally not permitted.  And we can learn little in Brazil, 
where many firms employ the substitute Brazilian institution of the “fiscal board. Our approach, in 
contrast, involves building a Brazil board structure subindex that takes both institutions into account. 
Having built country-specific indices, we then assess whether governance affects firm market 
value (proxied by Tobin’s q) in each country and find substantial differences across firm fixed effects 
(FE), random effects (RE), cross-sectional OLS, or pooled OLS results.  We conduct extensive sensitivity 
tests and find that the coefficients on the country indices are somewhat sensitive to control variables 
(strongly so with the weaker cross-sectional and pooled OLS specifications), and quite sensitive to the 
functional form we choose for the dependent variable and how we address outliers. 
The new methodology we employ – conducting a multicountry study using similar-but-not-
identical country-level governance indices – can be seen as a “middle way” between single-country 
studies, from which it is hard to generalize; and “massively multicountry” studies.  We develop methods 
appropriate for (cautiously) generalizing across a number of countries, which may provide a way to 
develop a more credible connection between governance and firm value or performance.6 
Some lessons from this project for efforts to assess whether a change in firm governance will 
cause a change in firm value.  Most centrally, we build country-specific indices which capture, as best we 
can, the unobserved underlying concepts of sound governance.  A “generic” index that uses common 
elements across countries is unlikely to capture much of interest.  Researchers also need to: (i) move 
toward panel data with firm fixed (or at least random) effects; (ii) develop broad governance indices; (iii) 
vary how one specifies the dependent variable and handles outliers; and (iv) use extensive control 
variables.   Not every paper will achieve all of these steps, but one should place little weight on papers 
which have none or few of them. 
                                                 
6  This research complements our studies of individual countries.  At the risk of an annoying amount of self-citation:  
In Brazil, see Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010, 2012); Black, de Carvalho and Sampaio (2012), de Carvalho and 
Pennacchi (2012).  In India, see Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010) Black and Khanna (2007); Dharmapala 
and Khanna (2013).  In Korea, see Black, Jang and Kim (2006a); Black and Kim (2012); Black, Kim, Jang and Park 
(2013).  In Russia, see Black (2001), Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006).  In Turkey, see Ararat, Orbay, and 
Yurtoglu (2010); Ararat, Black and Yurtoglu (2013). 
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This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes our country-level governance indices. 
Section 3 develops our methodology.  Section 4 presents results for individual countries.  Section 5 
presents pooled cross-country results.  Section 6 concludes.  We skip the usual literature review, and refer 
readers to the recent review by one of us (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013), and the briefer review in Black, 
de Carvalho and Gorga (2012).  We focus on methods and on results for an overall governance index.  In 
a companion article, we study which subindices and elements predict firm market value, for which firms, 
in which countries (Black et al., 2013).  Disclosure is consistently valuable across countries, board 
structure has predictive power in some countries, but little else about governance has a consistent effect.  
2.  Samples, Governance Surveys, and Indices 
To build governance indices, we rely on private surveys in Brazil (2004, 2006, 2009); India 
(2006, 2007, 2012), Korea (1998-2004), public data plus extensive hand collection in Turkey (2006-
2011), and a mix of public and private data in Russia (1999-2005).7   
2.1  Brazil as Illustrative Example:  Governance Survey 
We use Brazil here to illustrate our approach.  An expanded working paper version of this article 
provides similar information for other countries (Black et al., 2013b).  Our Brazil index is based on 
extensive survey distributed in 2005, 2007, and 2009 to all public firms (for details, see Black, de 
Carvalho and Gorga, 2010).  The survey is similar, where feasible, to the India and Korea surveys.  Table 
1 summarizes the replies.  We obtain sufficient information from at least one survey to build our Brazil 
Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) and compute Tobin’s q and control variables for 142 of 254 sample-
eligible firms (56%).  The respondents represent 72% of the market cap of eligible firms; thus, 
respondents tend to be larger firms.  However, only 72 firms answered two or more surveys.8  We also 
obtain information from the CVM website, firm charters, and firm annual reports.9 
                                                 
7  We exclude state-controlled firms, subsidiaries of foreign companies, and banks. The Brazil, India, and Korea 
surveys are available on request.  Russia differs from the other countries.  We rely on six different privately created 
governance indices, rather than building our own index (see Black, Love, and Rachinsky, 2006, for details).  Russia 
also has weaker data for control variables.  Statements in this paper about regularities across countries include 
Russia only to the extent that the underlying data is available.  Our challenges with Russia underscore the general 
theme of this paper about the challenges in obtaining data on governance across countries.    
8  India and Russia pose similar concerns with sample selection bias and a highly unbalanced panel.  We have close 
to complete coverage of public firms in Korea and Turkey.  See expanded working paper for details. 
9   We also obtain data on firms’ market capitalization and listing level from Bovespa, at 
www.bovespa.com.br/principal.asp; financial data from the Economatica database, at www.economatica.com; basic 
company information from annual reports, available from InfoInvest at www.infoinvest.com.br; and information on 
cross-listing from databases maintained by Bank of New York, at www.adrbny.com, Citibank, at 
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2.2.  Brazil Corporate Governance Index and Subindices 
Table 2 lists the subindices and their elements for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey.  Table 2 also 
indicates which elements are non-public (available only from our surveys).  For each element, it indicates 
in which countries the element is used, “available” but not used (we have data, or could obtain it without 
great difficulty) or “feasible” (we could compute it with substantial additional effort, usually to hand-
collect data from company annual reports).  We include an element in the overall index only if we judge it 
to be “useful” if:  (i) it is often believed to correspond to good governance (sometimes with empirical 
support, but more often not); (ii) we have reasonably complete data; (iii) there is reasonable variation 
across firms (thus, the index does not include elements required by law); and (iv) the element is 
sufficiently different from another element to justify inclusion.  BCGI is composed of six subindices, 
which in turn reflect 41 useful firm attributes.  Most elements are dichotomous (coded as "1" if a firm has 
the attribute and "0" otherwise).  We normalize continuous variables to run from 0~1. 
Brazil Board Structure Subindex (7 elements).  Board independence is seen as a core element of 
corporate governance (e.g., OECD, 2004; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008).  An audit committee, 
can help to ensure the integrity of financial reporting (e.g., Klein, 2002).  In Brazil, the fiscal board plays 
a role in oversight of financial reporting similar to an audit committee, and often substitutes for the audit 
committee, so our governance index considers this institution as well.10 
Brazil Board Procedure Subindex (6 elements).  Board and internal firm procedures are common 
components of governance indices.  Their effect on firm value remains an open question.  Our index 
assesses whether a board meets at least four times per year, whether it regularly evaluates the CEO and 
other executives, whether board members receive materials in advance of board meetings, and whether 
the firm has a bylaw governing the board and a code of ethics. 
Brazil Disclosure Subindex (11 elements).  Disclosure is associated with higher firm market value 
(e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005).  We identify 11 usable disclosure elements, which include, among other 
things, whether the firm prepares financial statements that meet international accounting standards; 
prepares English language financial statements; provides financial disclosures, such as a statement of cash 
                                                                                                                                                             
wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm, CVM, at www.cvm.gov.br, Deutsche Bank, at www.adr.db.com, and 
JP Morgan, at www.adr.com. 
10  The fiscal board is elected by shareholders and must include a representative chosen by minority shareholders.  
The members of the fiscal board report individually at the annual shareholder meeting on whether they approve the 
company’s financial statements.  For Brazilian companies that cross-list in the U.S., which are required to have an 
audit committee under the Sarbanes-Oxley law, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission treats the fiscal board 
as an acceptable substitute. 
7
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flows, that are common in other countries but not required in Brazil; posts financial statements on a 
company web site; discloses its major shareholders; and discloses related party transactions (RPTs).11 
Brazil Ownership Subindex (5 elements).  A “wedge” between cash flow rights and voting rights 
can provide incentives for self-dealing (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002).  Many Brazilian firms 
use dual-class structures, with insiders holding most of the voting common shares and outsiders holding 
non-voting, common-equivalent preferred shares.  The ownership subindex includes the fraction of 
nonvoting shares; the largest shareholder’s fractional ownership of voting shares; the wedge between this 
person’s voting and economic rights; whether the control group is small (and hence more cohesive); and 
whether there are large outside blockholders who can monitor the controller. 
Brazil RPT Subindex (5 elements): RPTs are a core concern in many emerging markets (e.g., Bae, 
Kang and Kim, 2002; Atanasov et al., 2010).  Our RPT subindex includes four elements relating to the 
existence of RPTs and approval procedures for these transactions. 
Brazil Shareholder Rights Subindex (7 elements):  Minority shareholders rights are often seen as 
an important aspect of governance (e.g., Atanasov et al., 2010; Bennedsen, Nielsen, and Nielsen, 2012).  
We extract from the survey seven elements related to these rights including:  takeout rights on a sale of 
control; freezeout rights (above the legal minimum); shareholder rights for election of directors; 
arbitration of disputes with shareholders; preemptive rights; and 25% minimum free float. 
Computing and Combining Subindices.  Within each subindex, we weight each element equally.  
Thus, to compute Brazil Disclosure Subindex, we sum the 12 elements.  If an element value is missing, 
we use the average score for the nonmissing values.12  We reweight so each subindex runs from 0~100.  
BCGI score is an average of the subindex scores.  BCGI values range from 19.1 to 91.5 (mean = 62.1.  
For regressions, we normalize each subindex to mean 0, σ = 1, sum the normalized subindices, and 
normalize the sum; BCGI is thus a renormalized sum of normalized subindices. 
2.3.  Other Country Governance Indices 
India.  In India, similar to Brazil, we rely on our own surveys, conducted in 2006, 2007, and 
2012, for governance data.  India has stronger rules than Brazil; thus some Brazil governance elements 
are not meaningful in India; conversely many India elements are not available or not meaningful in 
Brazil.  We build an India Corporate Governance Index (ICGI), comprised of 42 elements, with 
                                                 
11  For this and some other elements, it is unclear which subindex to best assign them to.  For example, is disclosure 
of RPTs best assigned to Disclosure Subindex or to RPT Subindex?  We use our own (debatable) judgment. 
12  Brazil RPT Subindex is an exception.  If the firm’s charter forbids RPTs, the firm receives a score of 5.  If RPTs 
are not forbidden but firm does not engage in them, it receives a score of 4.  If a firm engages in RPTs, it scores 0~3 
depending on the procedure for approving RPTs. 
8
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subindices for Board Structure (6 elements); Board Procedure (13 elements); Disclosure (13 elements); 
RPTs (6 elements); and Shareholder Rights (4 elements).  We cannot construct a meaningful ownership 
subindex because India has a one share, one vote rule, and few pyramids.  We use similar elements in 
Brazil and India to the extent feasible.  Nonetheless, the two indices have only 14 common elements.  
ICGI values range from 24.6 to 86.9 (mean = 59.2.13 
Korea.  We have Korean governance data from 1998-2004.  For 2001-2004, we rely on a survey 
of all Korea Stock Exchange firms by the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS).  We hand 
collect data to extend the index back to 1998 (see Black and Kim, 2012, for details).  We build a Korea 
Corporate Governance Index (KCGI), comprised of 27 elements, with subindices for Board Structure (7 
elements); Board Procedure (12 elements); Disclosure (3 elements); Ownership (1 element); and 
Shareholder Rights (4 elements).  We lack the data to construct an RPT Subindex.14  KCGI values range 
from 7.9 to 88.3 (mean = 33.9). 
Turkey.  We have Turkish governance data from 2006-2011. We hand-collect data from firm 
corporate governance reports, annual reports, charters, financial statement footnotes, and firm websites.  
Our Turkey Corporate Governance Index (TCGI) includes 49 elements, divided into subindices for Board 
Structure (8 elements); Board Procedure (5 elements); Disclosure (23 elements); Ownership (5 elements); 
and Shareholder Rights (8 elements).  We lack enough data to construct an RPT Subindex. 15  TCGI 
values range from 9.3 to 74.5 (mean = 42.4). 
In India, Korea, and Turkey, we construct subindices and an overall country index in the same 
manner as for Brazil. 
Russia.  In Russia, we rely not on a single index but instead on six separate indices, created by 
others, covering different firms at different times over 1999-2005.  Because we do not control how the 
indices are built, we cannot build subindices. We normalize each index and use the normalized indices to 
build an overall Russia Corporate Governance Index (RCGI).16   
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the non-normalized indices.  The within-firm scores in 
Brazil and Korea show substantial variation across time; there is less variation in India and Turkey.17   
                                                 
13  The original 2006 ICGI used in Balasubramanian, Black, and Khanna (2010) used 49 elements; we lost 7 of these 
due to need to maintain consistent elements across survey years. 
14  We include one RPT-related element (RPTs require board approval) in the Shareholder Rights Subindex. 
15  We include two RPT-related elements in the Shareholder Rights Subindex. 
16  Russia also has more limited control variables.  We include it in reporting results below only where feasible. 
17  The expanded working paper version of this article provides year-by-year data. 
9
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2.4.  Comparison to Developed Markets 
Our elements and subindices reflect measures that we judged would likely be important in 
emerging markets.  Different elements would be appropriate in developed markets.  For example, BCGI 
and the 24-element Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) “GIM” index include only three common 
elements:  classified board of directors, dual-class common stock, and take-out rights.  Similar, only four 
elements of BCGI are among the 44 elements of the Institutional Shareholder Services index (see 
Aggarwal et al., 2009):  separate CEO and chair, majority of outside directors, no classified board, and no 
dual-class common stock.  Some non-overlap reflects the limited scope of the GIM and ISS indices,18 but 
most reflects differences between a US-centric index and one appropriate in an emerging market. 
2.5.  Commonalities and Differences across Countries 
While we seek to maintain common subindices and elements where feasible, we adapt our 
governance index to the data available in each country and to country-specific institutions.  For example, 
18 of the 41 Brazil elements are unique to Brazil.  Table 2, which summarizes the elements we use in 
each country, is mind-numbingly complex.  Even more complexity is buried in dozens of footnotes to an 
offline version, which document details on how elements are coded in different countries and different 
years.19  Still more complexity lurks in different meanings of the same variable in different countries,20 
and in our judgments about how to define elements.21  In that complexity lies a central message of this 
article.  We did our best to build indices that cover similar aspects of governance in each country.  At the 
subindex, we hope that we more-or-less succeeded.  Individual elements, however, differ greatly across 
countries.  Table 2 contains 121 elements.  Of these, 84 are used in only one country; 25 in two countries ; 
8 in three countries, and none are used in all four countries. 
Suppose that we built a “Public Index”, using elements that are publicly available in all five 
countries.  That index would have only four elements:  one board structure element (audit committee 
                                                 
18  For criticism of these indices, see Bhagat, Bolton and Romano (2008); Daines, Gow and Larcker (2010). 
19  For example, in some countries, we can measure whether a director is “outside”; in others, we can measure 
whether a director is “independent” (defined somewhat differently in each country).  In Korea, we know whether the 
audit committee has 2/3 outside directors; in India we know whether it has a majority of outside directors.  We 
ignore these and other small differences in meaning, exercising judgment as to what is “small”. 
20  For example, the element “CEO is NOT chairman of the board” has a very different meaning for a stand-alone 
firm, where the chair is likely to be an outside director; than for a firm which belongs to a business group, where the 
chairman often represents the group. 
21  In Brazil, for example, a fiscal board can be “permanent” (established in the firm’s charter).  If not, it can still be 
called for a particular year by request of 10% of the shareholders.  We coded a firm as “having” a fiscal board if this 
board was either permanent or had been called in four or five of the last five years. 
10
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exists); three disclosure elements (firm discloses 5% holders; firm has English language financials; 
financial statements include statement of cash flows); and no elements for the other four subindices.  In 
individual countries, there is even less to the Public Index than the four apparent elements.  Consider 
India.  Audit committees are required; all financials are in English and include a statement of cash flows.  
This leaves one useful element – whether the firm discloses 5% holders.  Even there, usefulness is 
limited, since disclosure of ownership by the control group is required. 
Can educated guessing help?  We don’t think so.  Consider Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell 
(2008).  When they lack data on which directors are independent, they infer independence based on 
whether a director is employed by the firm or has the same family name as the controlling family.  For 
Brazil in 2002, they estimate that 57% of directors of their sample firms were independent.  We find that 
the mean percentage of outside directors in 2004 is 23%.  The difference in percentages is far too large to 
be explained by different samples.22  In our view, their estimate provides mostly noise, not signal. 
2.6.  Can We Build An Index with Common Elements? 
We can improve on the Public Index by using private survey data, at the cost of building an index 
that cannot be replicated in a massively multicountry study.  Suppose we ask:  which elements are 
available during our sample period in Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, and useful (have meaningful 
variation) in at least two countries?  We use these elements to build a “Common-2 Index.”  Table 2 
indicates the elements of the Public and Common-2 indices. 
The Common-2 Index includes 14 elements:  5 in board structure 3 in disclosure, 2 each in board 
procedure and ownership; and one each for shareholder rights and RPTs.  As with the Public Index, only 
some elements are meaningful in each country.23  Of the 13 elements, 11 are useful in three countries; 
none are useful in all four.  As we discuss below, the Common-2 Index has very little predictive value.  
Moreover, even if we found that it had economic or statistical significance, we could have limited 
confidence that this significance came from the measured elements, rather than unmeasured elements 
which were correlated with the measured elements.   
                                                 
22  Bovespa has multiple listing levels, with different corporate governance standards.  The highest level, Novo 
Mercado, requires only 20% independent directors. 
23  With substantial data collection effort, we could add three additional “feasible” elements to the Common-2 Index; 
all within board structure and board procedure.  Some additional disclosure elements would be available today, but 
we don’t have them for the periods covered by our study. 
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3.  Methodology:  Construct Validity and Endogeneity Concerns 
3.1.  Embracing Construct Validity 
Prior multicountry studies have used the same index across countries.  Given the severe 
constraints on our ability to build an index with common elements, we adopt a different approach.  We 
abandon the pretense that an index comprised of common elements can capture what’s important about 
governance in each country.  We posit instead that there is an underlying, unobserved concept of “overall 
corporate governance”, which can usefully be divided into unobserved “buckets” of board structure, 
board procedure, disclosure, ownership, shareholder rights, and RPT control; and that each bucket is 
composed of unobserved “aspects”, such as true effectiveness of the board of directors; the audit 
committee (or a local substitute), and so on.  For us, measuring corporate governance involves developing 
measurable constructs – at the element, subindex, and overall index levels – that map decently onto 
unobserved true governance.  That is, we are measuring constructs (elements) within larger constructs 
(subindices) within a larger construct (overall country index).  The mapping from constructs to underlying 
governance will depend on local rules and institutions.  The unobserved aspects of governance differ 
across countries; thus, the elements and subindices we construct to capture them must vary as well. 
Also, we are interested in the causal question:  Will a within-country change in governance 
change Tobin’s q, or another outcome variable?  Governance levels vary greatly across countries, 
reflecting a mix of local rules and practices.  Only elements with meaningful variation across firms and 
time are useful in assessing causation.  Those elements will also vary substantially across countries. 
How will we know whether we have chosen sensible constructs – whether, say, the Brazil 
governance construct measures something similar to the India construct?  A null result could mean either 
that governance doesn’t affect Tobin’s q or that we have not measured governance correctly.  A result in 
some countries (but not others) could mean that governance only matters in those countries or that we 
have built better constructs in those countries.  But if we find a positive association across countries, with 
a broad index and a reasonably strong research design (say firm fixed effects with extensive control 
variables), this provides evidence both that governance predicts Tobin’s q and that our country-specific 
constructs do a decent job of measuring governance.24 
                                                 
24  With a broad index and a good research design, it is less likely (though never impossible) that an omitted non-
governance variable explains the association between governance and Tobin’s q.  One would want to “drill down” 
and assess whether the predictive value of an overall index comes from similar subindices and, to the extent feasible, 
similar elements.  We conduct that drill-down in our companion paper. 
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3.2.  Regression Specifications 
So onward, to what we do and what we find.  Our principal dependent variable is ln(Tobin’s q).  
Tobin’s q is a common dependent variable in governance-to-value studies.  We take logs to reduce the 
influence of high-q outliers.  We also exclude outlier firms, for which a studentized residual from 
regressing ln(q) on country CGI (year-by-year for panel regressions) > |1.96|.  Within each country, we 
regress ln(q) on CGI and a vector of control variables, denoted Xi.  We use four different models. The 
first model is cross-sectional, using one year from each country.25 
0 1 2ln * *i i iQ CGI     iβ X   Model 1 (cross-sectional OLS) 
Many single-country studies, and all prior multicountry studies, use only cross-sectional data.  
One goal of this article is to improve on this specification by using panel data on governance.  We use 
three specifications:  pooled OLS, firm random effects (RE), and firm fixed effects (FE).  All use standard 
errors with year dummies, firm clusters, and an unbalanced panel. 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,ln * *i t i t i t t i tQ CGI g      β X    Model 2 (pooled OLS) 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,ln * *i t i t i t i t i tQ CGI f g       β X   Model 3 (RE and FE) 
The FE model provides unbiased estimates even if the firm effects are correlated with other 
variables, but imposes a substantial loss of sample size.  In Brazil, only 72 of the 159 firms in our dataset 
appear at least twice; in India, only 186 of 399 appear at least twice.  Moreover, with FE, we can study 
only aspects of governance with substantial within-firm time variation.  Thus, both RE and FE are useful 
specifications, with different strengths. 26 
3.3.  Control Variables 
Many firm characteristics are potentially associated with both Tobin's q and governance.  We 
therefore include extensive control variables to reduce omitted variable bias (OVB).  Table 4 defines our 
principal control variables and indicates which is available in each country.  We work hard to limit loss of 
sample size due to missing data through how we define control variables.27 
                                                 
25  We use the first year with governance data for Brazil (2004), India (2006), and Turkey (2006), 2001 (first year 
after major reforms) for Korea, and 2003 (year with most observations) for Russia. 
26  We discuss in Part 5 additional specifications which pool results across countries.  Some studies seek to address 
endogeneity by instrumenting for governance, Tobin’s q, or both.  We find the instruments unconvincing, and do not 
pursue this approach here.  On concerns with instrumental variables in finance and accounting generally, see 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010); Roberts and Whited (2011), Atanasov and Black (2013). 
27  Some examples:  We sometimes impute values from an adjacent year.  We generally define leverage as total 
liabilities/(total liabilities + book value of assets), but use total debt instead of total liabilities in India because in the 
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We use the following control variables.  Firm size:  ln(assets) to control for the effect of firm size 
on Tobin’s q; Firm age:  ln(years listed +1), because younger firms are likely to be faster-growing and 
more intangible asset-intensive, which can lead to higher Tobin’s q; Leverage:  measured as total 
liabilities/total assets.  Leverage can influence Tobin’s q by affecting income taxes benefits and reducing 
free cash flow problems; it is also mechanically related to Tobin’s q.  Growth prospects and profitability:  
Tobin’s q is related to a firm’s growth prospects and profitability.  We control for geometric sales growth 
over the last 3 years, and for profitability using both net income/assets and EBIT/sales.  Capital intensity 
and asset tangibility:  Asset tangibility can both predict Tobin’s q and affect what type of governance a 
firm needs.  We control for PPE/sales, capex/PPE, R&D/sales, and advertising/sales.  Liquidity:  share 
turnover (traded shares/total shares) and free float, since share prices may be higher for firms with more 
liquid shares.  Ownership:  fractional ownership by the largest shareholder; by foreign investors, and the 
state.  Product market competition, which can substitute for governance in imposing discipline on 
managers:  exports/sales and domestic market share in the firm’s principal industry.28   
3.4.  Endogeneity 
Except for Korea, we have no exogenous shock to governance.29  Thus, the different flavors of 
endogeneity are important concerns.  What can be said about how likely our results are to involve 
causation?  Consider reverse causation, with firm value predicting governance, and the optimal 
differences flavor of endogeneity, with firms choosing their governance to meet firm-specific needs.  To 
limit the extent of reverse causation, we measure governance in the first part of a year and Tobin’s q at 
year-end.  Moreover, in individual country studies, time-varying firm characteristics only weakly predict 
governance.  Firm, industry, and business-group effects can be stronger predictors of governance, but our 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prowess database, total liabilities = total assets, for some reason.  In Korea, state ownership is missing for 2004; we 
imputed values from 2003.  We drop firm-years with zero or negative sales.  In India, we use ln(years since 
incorporation) instead of ln(years listed +1), because listing year is not available.  For India for 2012, we use the 
most recent available data (for fiscal 2010, ending March 31, 2011) to compute control variables.  Russia controls 
are more limited than in other countries.  See expanded working paper for more details. 
28  We also include several variables which drop out with firm fixed effects, but are relevant for other specifications.  
Industry dummies, defined separately in each country (9 dummies for Brazil, 11 for India, 4-digit Korean SIC codes 
for Korea, and 2-digit US-equivalent SIC codes for Turkey and “common controls” regressions.).  US cross-listing 
dummy and MSCI index dummy to proxy for liquidity and foreign investor interest.  Business group dummy, because 
group firms may behave differently than stand-alone firms. 
29  In Korea, large firms (assets > 2 trillion won) face a legal shock to governance which comes into force in 2000-
2001, during our study period; we study that shock elsewhere (black, Jang and Kim, 2006; Black and Kim, 2012).   
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FE and (less strongly, RE) specifications address these.30  The most important endogeneity concern is 
likely to be omitted variables which are associated with both governance and Tobin’s q.  Here, firm fixed 
effects and extensive controls help; as does a broad governance index, which is less likely to be 
accidentally associated with a particular omitted variable. 
4.  Country-Level Results 
4.1.  Cross-Sectional and Pooled OLS 
In Table 5, we examine the association between country governance and Tobin’s q, across 
countries and regression models.  In each panel, we report the coefficient on country CGI and suppress 
the coefficients on the control variables.  Panel 1 presents pure cross-sectional OLS results, using only one 
year for each country. 31   In each country, higher CGI predicts higher Tobin’s q, by economically 
meaningful amounts.  In Brazil, for example, the 0.150 coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in BCGI predicts an 16% increase in ln(Tobin’s q). 
Yet the apparent consistency is deceiving.  We show year-by-year, cross-sectional OLS results in 
Table 6.  We show results for each year for Brazil and India, and an early year, a middle year, and the last 
sample year for other countries.  In each country, the coefficient on CGI is significant in some years, yet 
insignificant in others, and (except in Russia) sometimes negative.  In India, for example, we find a 
significant 0.107 (t = 2.09) coefficient for 2006, but the coefficient for 2007 is 0.000 and for 2012 is -
0.058 (both insignificant).  In Brazil, the coefficient on BCGI is significant in 2004 at 0.150 (t = 3.10), but 
insignificant in 2006 (coeff. = 0.073; t = 1.22) and 2009 (coeff. = 0.062, t = 1.43).   
Subindex level results (presented in our companion paper) provide further reason for concern 
with the reliability of cross-sectional results.  If we include each subindex separately in a regression 
otherwise similar to Table 5, panel 1, the significant subindices are board structure (Brazil and Korea) 
disclosure (Korea and Turkey), RPTs (Brazil), and shareholder rights (Turkey).  We found the opposite 
(negative) sign on board structure for Brazil in Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012), using the same 
governance data and a  similar specification.32  For Brazil, the sign on RPT Subindex flips with pooled 
OLS.  For Turkey, the results for Shareholder Rights Subindex survive with random effects, but vanish 
                                                 
30  See Black and Kim (2012) (Korea); Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010) (India); Ararat, Black and 
Yurtoglu (2013) (Turkey).  
31  We use the first available year in Brazil, India, and Turkey.  In Korea, we use 2001 (just after the large firm 
reforms come into effect).  In Russia, we use 2003, where we have the most complete data. 
32  We discuss this puzzling result (opposite signs from very similar specifications) in our companion paper.  A 
major reason:  When firms restate prior year financial results, the Economatica database revises the prior year 
numbers.  Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012) use the original numbers; here we use the revised numbers. 
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with fixed effects.  Our conclusion:  Single-year cross-sectional regressions are not a reliable basis for 
inferring much of anything about corporate governance in emerging markets. 
Panel 2 of Table 5 presents pooled OLS results.  Pooled OLS is still a weak specification because 
it ignores firm effects; we present it largely for comparison to the pure cross-sectional results in Panel A 
and the firm random effects and fixed effects results in Panels 3 and 4.  The coefficients on country CGI 
become smaller for all countries except Russia, and become insignificant in India.  At the same time, t-
statistics rise in several countries due to larger sample size. 
4.2.  Firm Random and Fixed Effects 
We present firm random effects results in Table 5, Panel 3.  Country CGI positively and 
significantly predicts Tobin’s q in all countries.  A Breusch-Pagan test strongly rejects the absence of firm 
effects, and implies that pooled OLS will be biased.  At the same time, a Hausman test rejects the 
equivalence of RE and FE models.33  The median “lambda”, indicating whether RE results are closer to 
pooled OLS (λ = 0) or to FE ((λ = 1) is low for Brazil at 0.33 and India at 0.30, but higher for Korea and 
Turkey, which have more data years and a more balanced panel, at 0.63 in Korea and 0.66 in Turkey. 
The Hausman test results suggest that both pooled OLS and RE results are likely to be biased.  In 
our experience, RE coefficients are often in between pooled OLS and FE; this is the case for all countries 
except Brazil (where we lose many firms in the FE specification).  If so, and especially if λ is close to 1, it 
RE is likely less biased than pooled OLS.  This is an opinion, informed by experience, not a theorem.34 
In Panel 4, with fixed effects, the results generally weaken.  Coefficients drop in all countries 
except India and t-statistics drop in all countries.  The coefficients remain significant in India, Korea, and 
Russia, and are marginally significant in Turkey, but become insignificant in Brazil.  This weakening 
likely reflects a combination of bias in the RE coefficients, loss of sample size, and limited within-firm 
variation.  There is no easy way to assess the relative contribution of each factor. 
The coefficients on CGI in Table 5 are economically important and have plausible magnitudes.  
For example, the significant FE coefficients range from 0.045 to 0.075.  This implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in governance predicts a 4.6-7.8% increase in Tobin’s q. 
                                                 
33  We treat the Hausman test results as merely suggestive.  The test only runs in three countries (Brazil, Korea, and 
Turkey), is unreliable in Brazil due to a highly unbalanced panel, and does not allow for clustered standard errors. 
34  We are aware of no simulation or other research that assesses the likely relative bias of pooled OLS versus firm 
random effects in situations where firm fixed effects results may be unreliable. 
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4.3.  Robustness to Choice of Control Variables 
In Table 7, we present robustness checks for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey using RE and FE, 
with different specifications for control variables and the dependent variable.  All specifications are the 
same as in Table 5, except as indicated.  Panel 1 reproduces our base specification from Table 5.  In 
Panels 2-5 we vary the control variables.  In Panel 2, we use a common set of controls instead of country-
specific controls.  This principally means dropping several variables that we lack in Brazil.  The India and 
Korea results strengthen, suggesting that even with FE, extensive time-varying controls are needed to 
limit OVB.  In Panel 3, we return to country-specific controls, but winsorize the control variables.  This 
has little impact, relative to Panel 1.  In Panel 4, we use a limited set of control variables, similar to those 
used in Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008).35  Relative to Panel 2, the coefficients change somewhat 
in India and Korea, but strongly in Turkey, where FE results go from barely significant (coeff. = .050; t = 
1.88) to easily so (coeff. = 0.068; t = 2.48).  In Panel 5, we use a still smaller set of control variables, 
similar to those used in Durnev and Kim (2005).36  The Turkey results strengthen further (coeff. = .077, t 
= 2.70).  And the Brazil FE coefficient leaps from 0.088 (insignificant) to 0.162 (strongly significant, t = 
3.79).  Sensitivity to choice of controls increases if we use pooled OLS instead of RE or FE.37   
We conclude that there is clear need for governance researchers to use extensive control variables 
and report the sensitivity of results to choice of controls.  At the same time, the coefficients on country 
CGI do not vary greatly with modest variations in our full set of controls.  The changes across Panels 1-3 
are largest in Korea (FE coefficients range from [0.44, 0.55] depending on control variables).  The 
relative stability of these estimates suggests that if one uses panel data with FE or RE, a reasonable 
number of time periods, and extensive firm-level controls, it is plausible that remaining OVB will be 
limited. 
4.4.  Robustness to Choice of Dependent Variable 
In the remaining panels of Table 7, we vary the specification of the dependent variable.  In Panel 
6, instead of excluding outliers, we winsorize ln(q).  Compared to Panel 1, the results strengthen in 
Turkey but weaken in other countries.  In India, we lose significance for both RE and FE; the FE 
                                                 
35  The controls in Panel 4 are ln(assets; ln(years listed + 1); sales growth; PPE/sales; R&D/sales (n.a. in Brazil); 
exports/sales (n.a. in Brazil); 2-digit US SIC industry dummies; cross-listing dummy; year dummies. 
36  The controls in Panel 5 are ln(assets; R&D/sales (not available in Brazil); exports/sales (not available in Brazil); 
country-specific industry dummies; cross-listing dummy; year dummies. 
37  For example, in Korea, the increase in the coefficient on KCGI if we use limited controls, relative to the base 
specification, is +.0037 for FE (8%), but grows to +.0086 for RE (18%); and +.0256 for pooled OLS (49%).  Thus, 
the weak results from these specifications are further weakened with limited controls. 
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coefficient drops from .075 to only .015.  In Brazil, the RE results become only marginally significant.  In 
Panel 7, we neither winsorize nor exclude outliers.  Results are slightly weaker than in Panel 6.  In Panel 
8, we use non-logged Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, but exclude outliers.  The results weaken 
again; only in Korea are the coefficients still statistically significant. In Panel 9, we switch to 
ln(market/book) as dependent variable, and exclude outliers.  Significance is similar to our base 
specification in Brazil, India, and Korea, but FE is insignificant for Turkey.  The overall message:  How 
one defines the dependent variable and handles outliers can have a major impact on results. 
5.  Pooled Regressions across Countries 
5.1.  Pooled Index Results 
We assess in Table 8 what results we would get if we treated our distinct country indices as if 
they capture the same underlying construct.  We combine CGI scores across Brazil, India, Korea, and 
Turkey into a “Pooled CGI”, and use this pooled index to predict Tobin’s q for a sample which includes 
all four countries.  In Panels 1-4, we use specifications similar to Table 5:  cross-sectional OLS using 
selected years for each country; pooled OLS; RE; and FE.  We use winsorized control variables and, of 
necessity, only common control variables.  Cross-sectional OLS includes country fixed effects; other 
specifications include year*country fixed effects.  In Panel 5, we use FE plus a stronger specification for 
controls, by interacting each with country dummies.  In OLS and FE specifications, we weight results 
from each country by 1/(number of firms), thus giving roughly equal weight to each country.  Weights are 
not available for RE.  We present the RE and FE specification below.  Letting c index countries, dc be 
country dummies, and suppressing the FE weights, the RE/FE specification is: 
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , , ,ln * * ( * )c i t c i t c i t i t c c i tQ CGI f g d       β X   Model 3-cc 
In column (1), Pooled CGI is strongly significant across models, with similar coefficients across 
Panels 2-5, in which we pool data across years.38  This suggests that our country indices are capturing 
something about governance that affects firm market value.  This, in turn, might justify combining scores 
from country-CGI indices that are broadly similar at the subindex level, but quite different at the element 
level, into pooled CGI. 
                                                 
38  A Breusch-Pagan test continues to strongly reject the absence of firm effects.  Median λ is 0.72, suggesting that 
RE may be an acceptable specification, albeit unweighted. 
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5.2.  Common-2 and Non-Common CGI Indices 
We next build the Common-2 Index, and assess what it predicts.  Recall from Section 2.5 that this 
index uses 14 elements which have data available in all four countries and which we judged to be useful 
in at least two countries.  We build country-level Comon-2 indices and a multicountry Common-2 Index 
following the same procedure as for overall CGI. 39 
Table 8, column (2) provides results for multicountry Common-2 Index.  This index takes a 
positive and significant coefficient for a pure cross-sectional OLS regressions in Panel 1 -- to which, as 
discussed above, we assign little value.  But the Common-2 Index drops in magnitude and becomes only 
barely significant with pooled OLS; drops further in magnitude with random effects, and becomes 
trivially small and insignificant with fixed effects (coeff. = 0.005; t = 0.32).  Thus, there is only very weak 
evidence that the best common index we can build predicts firm market value. 
We next assess the relative power of the common and non-common governance elements to 
predict Tobin’s q.  We adopt two approaches.  First, we build “reduced” country indices, composed solely 
of non-common elements, and a multicountry “Non-common CGI”, using the same process as for the full 
indices.  In column (3), we include Common-2 Index and Non-Common CGI in the same regression.  
Non-common CGI is statistically and economically strong across specifications.  In contrast, the 
coefficient on Common-2 Index is close to zero, never close to significant, and has mixed signs in the 
three pooled models.  In effect, Common-2 Index has no predictive power, separate from Non-common 
CGI.  Its power in column (2) can be seen as reflecting OVB, due to the 0.36 correlation between 
Common-2 Index and (omitted) Non-common CGI), which predicts Tobin’s q. 
This reinforces a point made in the Introduction.  There can be severe construct validity (and 
related OVB) concerns for a governance measure that – like our Common-2 Index – is relatively narrow 
and not tailored to country-specific norms and rules.  This concern was part of why we built broad, 
country specific indices, to better capture what about governance is likely to matters in each country. 
In column (4), we assess the relative power of the common and country-specific governance 
elements in a somewhat different manner, by includingCommon-2 Index and Pooled CGI in the same 
regression.  The coefficient on Common-2 Index (Pooled CGI) provides an estimate of the power of the 
part of Common-2 Index (Pooled CGI) that is orthogonal to Pooled CGI (Common-2 Index) to predict 
Tobin’s q, conditioned on controls.  Pooled CGI remains strong, with coefficients similar to column 1, 
                                                 
39  If a subindex has no usable elements in a particular country, we drop it, and compute the country index using the 
remaining subindices.  For example, RPT Subindex includes one element, for “RPTs require board approval.”  In 
Turkey, this element is legally required, so we cannot construct this subindex. 
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where it was included alone.  In contrast, the coefficients on Common-2 Index are negative in all 
specifications, and marginally significantly so with RE.  Taken together, the results in columns (3) and (4) 
provide strong evidence that what matters about corporate governance is captured by the non-common, 
country-specific elements, not by the common ones. 
We also examine the power of Common-2 Index in each country.  The last two rows of Table 3 
show within-country correlation coefficients between (i) Common-2 Index and CGI; and (ii) Common-2 
Index and Non-common Index.  The correlations with CGI range from 0.50 to 0.75, but some of this 
correlation is mechanical, because the Common-2 and country indices include some common elements.  
The correlations between Common-2 Index and Non-common CGI do not have this problem; they range 
from .26 in India to 0.62 in Korea.  The higher correlation in Korea suggests more severe OVB if the 
Common-2 Index were used alone in Korea.40 
We present coefficients on country Common-2 Index in the last row of Table 7.  The coefficients 
in Brazil, India, and Turkey are small and insignificant for both RE and FE.  In Korea, Common-2 Index 
is significant with RE, but insignificant with FE.  In pooled OLS results (not reported), Common-2 Index 
is again significant only in Korea.  This is a further caution sign for a common index:  Such results as one 
finds could be driven by a small number of countries.  One can only tell by examining results in each 
country.  To reinforce this point, we return to the pooled approach in Table 8 but drop Korea from the 
sample.  The coefficients on Common-2 Index become small and insignificant in all specifications; for 
example, the RE coefficient is 0.006 (t = 0.33). 
5.3.  Revisiting Prior Studies 
With the weak results for cross-sectional OLS and for Common-2 Index in mind, we revisit three 
well-known, massively multicountry studies, which use the common index approach:  Klapper and Love 
(2004); Durnev and Kim (2005); and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008).  These studies are often 
seen as providing evidence that firm-level governance predicts higher firm value.41 
                                                 
40  The Korea correlation could also suggest greater construct validity for Common-2 Index.  To distinguish between 
the two, we run country-level regressions, similar to Table 8, columns (3) and (4).  For Korea, Non-common CGI 
and overall CGI remain strong; in contrast, Non-common CGI is insignificant in all cases and takes a negative 
coefficient in RE and FE regressions similar to Table 8, column (4).  This suggests that OVB, rather than partial 
construct validity, is driving the RE coefficient on Common-2 Index, when included alone. 
41  Our goal is to assess the robustness of results, not to criticize these articles.  All were pioneering efforts when 
written.  Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) are concerned as much with what predicts 
governance as with whether governance predicts firm market value.  Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell conduct 
several of the robustness checks we suggest here.  Moreover, early efforts can take approaches that would be 
questioned later on; and many papers written some time ago use methods that would be seen as suboptimal today. 
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Klapper and Love (2004) report evidence that the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) cross-
country index for 2001 predicts higher Tobin’s q and ROA, with t-values around 2.75.  However, the 
CLSA index includes some subjective elements, scored by their analysts.42  Higher market valuations 
could affect those scores.  They have only a few controls (ln(sales), sales growth, PPE/sales, country 
dummies, and 1-digit industries).  Durnev and Kim (2005) use winsorized Tobin’s q as their dependent 
variable.  Their firm-level controls are limited (ln(sales), sales growth, R&D/sales, exports/sales, US 
cross-listing, consolidated financials); they use country random effects and include several developed 
countries in their sample (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore).  They find the CLSA index from 
2001 and the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Index from 2000 predict higher Tobin’s q, but weakly – 
with p-values of 0.06 for the CLSA index and 0.04 for S&P. 
Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) study the association between board independence and 
market value, proxied by raw Tobin’s q, for firms with a controlling shareholder.  For some countries, 
they guess which directors are independent; we discuss above why this is problematic.  Their control 
variables are better than Klapper and Love or Durnev and Kim, but still limited.  Their p-values with 
country fixed effects range from [.02, .10].  Their power comes from the markets with lower scores on a 
legal protection index and, in significant part, from India.  This is consistent with our view that firms in 
different markets may need different governance rules43  We conclude that our weak results for the 
Common-2 Index are not inconsistent with these studies.  They have somewhat stronger t- and p-values, 
but weaker specifications, in ways that, as we show above, can strongly affect results. 
6.  Conclusion 
The methodology goal of this article was to highlight and then address the challenges involved in 
cross-country assessments of what matters in corporate governance.  The core, related challenges in 
emerging markets are construct validity and lack of governance data, especially time-series data.  We 
address these by building country-specific indices, each of which relies heavily on hand-collected data.  
Important data challenges remain.  For example, we build a Disclosure Subindex in each country, but the 
number of elements varies from three in Korea to 21 in Turkey.  We are unable to build a meaningful 
RPT Subindex in Korea or in Turkey. 
Our results confirm the centrality of construct validity concerns.  Country-specific indices have 
power to predict Tobin’s q, both in each country and if pooled across countries.  In contrast, an index 
                                                 
42  See Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) for further discussion of the CLSA index. 
43  In unreported regressions, we find an insignificant coefficient on India Board Structure Subindex in regressions 
which include other subindices.  This suggests an OVB explanation for the Dahya et al. India results. 
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comprised of common elements predicts Tobin’s q hardly at al.  It has predictive power only in Korea, 
and even there loses power with FE.  Moreover, in a horse race between the common index and an index 
comprised of non-common elements, the common index has no predictive power.  Its apparent power in 
Korea thus likely reflects OVB, due to correlation between the common and non-common indices. 
Endogeneity, principally omitted variable bias, is a third major concern; we confirm its 
importance and address it by using a broad governance index, panel data with FE or RE and extensive 
control variables.  Sensitivity to specification is important and often underexamined; we respond by 
varying our regression models, control variables, and how we define the dependent variable.  Taking 
these concerns together, the results from prior multicountry studies, which use simple cross-sectional 
OLS, governance indices built from common elements, and limited control variables, are simply not 
reliable.   
Our substantive goal was to assess, in a cross-country framework, whether firm-level variation in 
corporate governance predicts firm-level variation in market value.  For that goal, country-specific 
indices, tailored to local rules and institutions, have substantial predictive power.  More tentatively, it may 
be possible to pool indices, which seek to measure similar underlying constructs in different, country-
specific ways, to develop meaningful cross-country governance measures. 
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Table 1. 
Brazilian sample. 
Number  of firms All public firms Responding  firms 
Market cap 
 (US$ billions) 
Capitalization of  
responding firms 
2004 261 63 (24%)   524 260 (49%) 
2006 233 92 (39%)   821 495 (60%) 
2009 254 97(38%) 1,191 747 (62%) 
2004 & 2006 254  28 1,191  
2004 & 2009 254  21 1,191  
2006 & 2009 254  53 1,191  
all 3 surveys 254  17 1,191  
at least one survey 254  142 (56%) 1,191  854 (72%) 
Note:  Total number of firms and market capitalization for all firms which responded to the 2004, 2006 and 2009 
Brazil corporate governance surveys. Market capitalization is based on exchange rate at Dec. 31, 2009 of 
R$1.75/US$1.  Market capitalization and number of Brazilian private firms is measured at end of survey year (for 
“overlap” rows, most recent year).  Last row indicates respondents that were public in 2009 and were in the dataset 
in at least one year.  All data excludes state-controlled firms, banks, and subsidiaries of foreign companies. 
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Table 2. 
Governance elements in each country and potential common index elements.   
ELEMENTS BRAZIL INDIA KOREA TURKEY LABEL COMMON 
INDEX-2
Years 2004, 06, 09 2006, 07, 12 1998-2004 2006-11   
Board Structure Subindex       
≥ 1 outside director X (NP) required required X bs_1 X 
> 1 outside director avail (NP)   X bs_2  
≥ 30% outside directors X (NP) required common avail bs_3 X 
≥ 50% outside directors X (NP) X X rare bs_4  
> 50% outside directors rare (NP) X X rare bs_5 X 
CEO is board member common (F) common (F) common (F) X bs_7  
CEO is NOT board chairman X X avail (NP) X bs_8 X 
Board has outside chair or lead director NA feas (NP) X rare bs_9  
≥ 50% outside directors or ≥ 1/3 outside directors 
& and CEO is not chairman feas (NP) X avail (NP) rare bs_10  
Firm has outside CEO NA feas feas X bs_11 -- 
Audit committee X required X required bs_13 PUB 
Audit committee has non-executive chair NA feas (NP) common (F) X bs_14  
Audit committee has outside director avail (NP) feas (NP) common (F) X bs_17 F 
Audit committee has majority of outside directors rare (NP) X X NA bs_18 F 
Compensation committee rare (NP) X X NA bs_21  
Outside director nominating committee rare (NP) NA X NA bs_22  
Corporate governance committee  rare (NP) NA rare (F) X bs_23  
Fiscal board exists X (NP) NM NM NM bs_24  
Permanent fiscal board or audit committee has 
minority shareholder representative X (NP) NM NM NM bs_25  
Board Procedure Subindex        
≥ 4 board meetings in last year X (NP) avail (NP)  X avail bp_3 X 
Average board attendance rate ≥ 80% common (NP) not avail feas NA bp_4  
Firm has system to evaluate CEO X (NP) X NA NA bp_5  
Firm has system to evaluate other executives X (NP) X NA NA bp_6  
Firm evaluates nonexecutive directors avail (NP) X X (NP) NA bp_7  
Firm has succession plan for CEO avail (NP) X NA NA bp_8  
Firm has nonexecutive director retire age NA X rare (F) NA bp_9  
Directors receive regular board training NA X NA NA bp_10  
Nonexecutives-only annual board meeting NA X rare (F) NA bp_11  
Outside directors-only annual board meeting  rare (NP) rare (NP) X NA bp_12  
Board receives materials in advance X (NP) X NA NA bp_13  
Nonexecutives can hire counsel, advisors NA (NP) X NA NA bp_14  
Firm has code of ethics X (NP) X feas (NP) X bp_15 F 
Bylaw/policy to govern board X (NP) not avail X (NP) X bp_16  
Directors’ votes recorded in board minutes avail (NP) avail (NP) X (NP) NA bp_17  
Firm has foreign outside director rare (NP) avail (NP) X avail bp_18 X 
Shareholders approve outside directors’ pay NA rare (NP) X (NP) NA bp_22  
Outside directors attend min. % of meetings NA avail (NP) X (70%) NA bp_23  
Firm has internal audit/control function NA avail (NP) required X bpa_1  
Audit committee membership disclosed NA avail (NP) required X bpa_2  
Bylaw to govern audit committee avail (NP) X X (NP) NA bpa_3  
Company discloses audit committee bylaws NA NA feas X bpa_4  
Audit committee recommends external auditor NA X NA NA bpa_5  
Outside directors on audit comm meet separately NA X NA NA bpa_6  
Audit committee  includes acc’g or finance expert avail (NP) required X (NP) NA bpa_9  
Audit committee approves internal audit head NA avail (NP) X (NP) NA bpa_10  
≥ 4 audit committee meetings/ year NA NA X NA bpa_16  
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ELEMENTS BRAZIL INDIA KOREA TURKEY LABEL COMMON 
INDEX-2
Disclosure Subindex       
RPTs are disclosed to shareholders X (NP) X required required dis_1 X 
Firm has regular meetings with analysts X (NP) X X (NP) NA dis_2  
Firm discloses 5% holders common X required avail dis_3 PUB 
Control group shareholder agreement disclosed  feas X NA NA dis_4  
Annual financials on firm website NA X avail, NM X dis_5  
Quarterly financial statements are consolidated X feas feas required dis_6  
Quarterly financials on firm website NA X NA X dis_7  
Firm puts annual report on firm website NA X NA X dis_8  
Directors’ report on firm  website NM X NM NM dis_9  
Corp governance report on firm website NM X NM X dis_10  
Firm discloses material events on firm website NA NA NA X dis_11  
Firm discloses annual agenda of corporate events X NA required X dis_12  
Firm charter available on firm website NA NA NM X dis_14  
English language financial statements exist X NM X (NP) X dis_15 PUB 
Financials include statement of cash flows X required required required dis_16 PUBonly
Financial statements in IFRS or US GAAP X feas rare required dis_17  
MD&A discussion in financial statements X required required NA dis_18  
Shareholder voting information on firm website NA NA NA X dis_19  
Firm discloses list of insiders NA NA NA X dis_20  
Firm discloses director shareholdings NA feas (NA) required X dis_21  
Controlling shareholder disclosed    X dis_22  
Code of conduct/ethics contents disclosed    X dis_23  
Governance charter or guidelines disclosed NA avail (NP) NA X dis_24  
Annual meeting results disclosed required not avail required X dis_25  
Board members' roles/employment disclosed avail NA required X dis_26  
Board members' background disclosed avail NA X X dis_27  
Board members date of joining board disclosed feas NA required X dis_28  
Background of senior managers disclosed avail NA No avail X dis_29  
Information re internal audit/control disclosed NA NA required X dis_30  
Number of board meetings disclosed avail (NP) feas (NP) required X dis_31  
Board resolutions disclosed NA NA required X dis_32  
Executive director compensation disclosed NA NA required X dis_33  
Auditor does not provide non-audit services X (NP) X feas NA dis_34  
Non-audit fees < 25% of total auditor fees NA X feas NA dis_35  
Full board reviews auditor's recommendations NA X NA NA dis_36  
Audit partner is rotated every 5 years NM X feas NA dis_38  
Ownership Structure Subindex       
Largest shareholder's fraction of common shares X avail avail X own_1 X 
Common shares/total shares X NM NM NM own_2  
Ownership parity X disparity is rare X X own_3 X 
Size of control group X NA NA NA own_5  
Firm has an outside 5% institutional investor X avail feas X own_6  
Controllers do not have special nomination rights NM not allowed not allowed X own_7  
Shares w. preferred voting rights do not exist NM not allowed not allowed X own_8  
Shareholder Rights Subindex       
All directors serve one year terms X avail (NP) feas, rare feas, rare sr_1  
Outside directors serve one year terms avail X feas X sr_2  
Firm allows voting by postal ballot avail (NP) X X Not allowed sr_3  
Company has policy against insider trading NA X NA X sr_4  
Board includes at least one member elected by 
minority shareholders X (NP) avail (NP) NA, rare NA, rare sr_5  
Cumulative voting for election of directors avail (NP) not allowed X not allowed sr_6 X 
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ELEMENTS BRAZIL INDIA KOREA TURKEY LABEL COMMON 
INDEX-2
Director candidates disclosed to shareholders in 
advance of shareholder meeting avail (NP) NA X NA sr_8  
No class of shares w. special nomination rights 
(except to give rights to 2nd major shareholder) not allowed not allowed not allowed X sr_9  
No class of shares w. multiple voting rights not allowed not allowed not allowed X sr_10  
No founder shares or other special cash flow rights not allowed not allowed not allowed X sr_11  
Firm has investor relations department or contact required avail NA X sr_12  
Freezeout offer based on shares' economic value X required required required sr_13  
Takeout rights on sale of control > legal minimum X NM NM NA sr_14  
Disputes with shareholders subject to arbitration X X NA NA sr_15  
Firm provides preemptive rights X (NP) required required common sr_16  
Free float is at least 25% of total shares X (NP) feas avail avail sr_17  
Related Party Transactions (RPT) Subindex       
No loans to insiders X avail (NP) NA X rpt_1  
No significant sales to/purchases from insiders X avail (NP) avail NA rpt_2  
No real property rental from or to an insider X avail (NP) feas NA rpt_3  
Negligible revenue from RPTs (0-1% of sales) NA avail (NP) avail avail rpt_4  
No significant RPTs (RPTs/sales < 5%) NA avail (NP) avail X rpt_5  
No RPTs needed board/audit committee approval 
in last 3 years NA avail (NP) feas NA rpt_6  
RPTs are on arms-length terms NA X NM NA rpt_7  
RPTs require board approval X (NP) avail (NP) X44 required rpt_8 X 
RPTs approved by noninterested directors X (NP) avail (NP) required  if > threshold required rpt_9  
RPTs approved by noninterested shareholders X (NP) avail (NP) NA NA rpt_10  
RPTs with executives approved by board, audit 
committee or shareholders NA X required NA rpt_11  
RPTs with executives approved by audit 
committee or non-interested directors NA X NA NA rpt_12  
RPTs with executives approved by shareholders NA X feas, rare NA rpt_13  
RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by 
board, audit committee or shareholders NA X 
required if > 
threshold NA rpt_14  
RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by 
audit committee or non-interested directors NA X NA NA rpt_15
 
RPTs banned by company charter X NA rare (F) NA rpt_16  
Cell entries:  X = element used; avail = element not used in country index, but data is available (we have it, or 
could obtain it without great effort).  feas or F = element not used, data could be collected with substantial additional 
effort.  NA = data not available.  NP = data from private survey; not publicly available.  NM = not meaningful 
(redundant, or involves institution unique to another country).  Required = required by law.  rare = avail but rare 
(minimal within country variation); Common = avail but nearly universal (minimal variation).  Public index = 
element is publicly avail in all countries.  Entries in common index-2 column:  X = element included in Common-2 
Index (avail in all four countries; useful in two or more); PUB = publicly available in all four countries plus Russia 
and element is used in common-2 index; PUBonly is similar, but element is not part of Common-2 Index. 
  
                                                 
44  Included in Korea Shareholder Rights Subindex. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics and correlation coefficients. 
Country Brazil India Korea Turkey Russia 
Summary Statistics  
Period 2004-2009 2005-2012 1998-2004 2006-2011 1999-2005 
Mean 62.13 59.17 33.90 42.49 0.00 
Median 65.44 59.87 32.02 41.84 0.05 
Standard Deviation 15.44 10.81 11.01 12.74 1.00 
Min. 19.11 24.62 7.86 9.34 -2.90 
Max. 91.53 86.92 88.33 74.65 3.51 
First Year Mean 53.34 57.28 24.64 41.56 n.m. 
Last Year Mean 63.96 60.96 42.43 44.21 n.m. 
Correlations 
CGI x Common-2 Index 0.58* 0.50* 0.75* 0.53* n.m. 
Non-common CGI x Common-2 
Index 0.52* 0.26* 0.62* 0.33* n.m. 
Notes: Sample is pooled across years.  Russian index is normalized. Other country indices are non-normalized 
(average of non-normalized sub-indices, each 0~100). CGI, Common-2, and non-common CGI indices are defined 
in the text. For correlations, * = significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Principal non-governance variables 
 Definitions Winsorization Used in Ccmmon set 
Tobin’s q (book value of debt + market value of common stock)/ book value of assets.  - all Yes 
ln(Tobin’s q) Tobin’s q in logarithm - all Yes 
ln (assets) Book value of assets - all Yes 
ln (listed years) Years since public listing + one in logarithm.  India:  Use years since incorporation. - al l -R Yes 
Leverage Total liabilities over total assets.  India:  Use total debt. 99% all yes 
Net Income/assets Ratio of net income over assets 1%/99% all Yes 
EBIT/sales Ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total sales 1%/99% all - R Yes 
3-yr sales growth Geometric average sales growth during past three years (or available period if less). 1%/99% all Yes 
PPE/sales Ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total sales  99% all - R Yes 
Turnover (shares traded in year t)/( shares outstanding), adjusted for share issuances and splits 99% all Yes 
Inside ownership Fractional ownership of common (and equivalent) shares by largest shareholder - all - R Yes 
Foreign ownership Fractional ownership by foreigners - all - R - 
State ownership Fractional ownership by the state - all - R Yes 
Free Float Fraction of shares floating on the stock exchange (excludes shares held by insiders) - all - I,R Yes 
Capex/PPE Ratio of capital expenditure to PPE 99% all - B,R - 
R&D/sales Ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. 99% all - B,R - 
Advertising/sales Ratio of advertising expense to total sales.  99% all - B,R - 
Exports/sales Ratio of export revenue to total sales.  99% all - B,R - 
Market share Firm’s share of sales by all public firms in same industry - all - B,R - 
Business group 1 if firm belongs to business group in year t, 0 otherwise. - all - R yes 
MSCI  1 if firm belongs to Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI). - all - B - 
US cross listing 1 if firm is cross-listed in US (any level) in year t, 0 otherwise - all - R yes 
industry dummies defined in each country; mapped to US 2-digit SIC codes when using common controls  all - R yes 
Definitions of principal non-governance variables, winsorization level for regressions in which we winsorized control variables; and indication of which 
controls are available in each of Brazil (B), India (I), Korea (K), Russia (R), and Turkey (T).  We drop firm-years with zero or negative sales.  Last column 
indicated which control variables are available in Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey; we use these variables in “common controls” regressions below.  We 
replace missing values with zero for R&D/sales, advertising/sales, and exports/sales.  Income statement amounts are measured for each year t; balance sheet 
amounts at the end of each year t. 
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Table 5 
Regressions using country-specific indices and controls. 
 dependent variable ln(Tobin’s q; outliers excluded) 
Panel   Brazil India Korea Turkey Russia 
1 
Cross-sectional OLS (first year in Brazil, 
India, Turkey; 2001 in Korea, 2003 in 
Russia) 
Country CGI 0.150*** 0.107** 0.057*** 0.121*** 0.088** (3.10) (2.09) (3.73) (2. 61) (2.39) 
No. of firms 59 233 495 167 63 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.32 0.54 0.41 0.84 
Year 2004 2006 2001 2006 2003 Q3 
2 Pooled OLS 
Country CGI 0.106*** 0.037 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.148*** (3.16) (1.42) (5.80) (2.89) (6.19) 
No. of obs. (firms) 236 (159) 636 (399) 3,285 (668) 974 (193) 964 (99) 
Adj. R2 0.35 0.30 0.53 0.48 0.66 
Period 2004-09 2006-12 1998-2004 2006-11 1999-2005 
3 Firm Random Effects 
Country CGI 0.114*** 0.064** 0.048*** 0.065*** 0.094*** (3.03) (2.57) (6.26) (2.73) (6.22) 
No. of obs. (firms) 236 (159) 636 (399) 3,285 (668) 974 (193) 964 (99) 
Breusch-Pagan test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test 0.0001 n.a. 0.0000 0.0000 n.a. 
Median λ 0.33 0.30 0.63 0.66 0.71 
Overall R2 0.40 0.33 0.53 0.48 0.63 
4 Firm Fixed Effects 
Country CGI 0.088 0.075** 0.045*** 0.050* 0.067*** (1.15) (2.27) (5.33) (1.88) (2.75) 
No. of obs. (firms) 146 (72) 423 (186) 3,252 (636) 971 (190) 964 (99) 
Within R2 0.50 0.34 0.38 0.52 0.45 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for indicated regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on country CGI and control variables.  Country CGI is renormalized sum of 
normalized subindices (mean =0; σ=1). Control variables are listed in Table 4.  Time-invariant dummy variables (industry, business group, US cross listing, 
MSCI) drop out with firm fixed effects.  Observations are excluded as outliers if a studentized residual from regressing ln(Tobin’s q) on CGI (year-by-year for 
panel data) > ±1.96.  Pooled regressions in Panels 2-4 use year dummies.  OLS and random effects regressions include industry dummies.  Fixed effects sample 
excludes firms observed only once.  t-statistics (heteroskedasticity-consistent for cross-sectional OLS; firm clusters otherwise (firm-index clusters in Russia)) are 
in parentheses.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.  
Values for Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are p-values. 
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Table 6.  Pure cross-sectional OLS 
Cross-sectional OLS regressions using country-specific indices and controls, for selected years. 
dependent variable ln(Tobin’s q; outliers excluded) 
  Brazil India Korea Turkey Russia 
Year 1 
Country CGI 0.150*** 0.107** -0.0103 0.121*** 0.029 (3.10) (2.09) (-0.60) (2.56) (0.34) 
No. of firms 59 233 429 167 46 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.32 0.47 0.41 0.573 
Year 2004 2006 1998 2006 2H2000 
Year 2 
Country CGI 0.073 -0.000 0.057*** -0.043 0.119*** (1.22) (-0.010) (3.73) (-0.87) (3.09) 
No. of firms 76 261 495 165 81 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.43 0.54 0.33 0.785 
Year 2006 2007 2001 2009 2H2003 
Year 3 
Country CGI 0.062 -0.058 0.0193 0.063 0.184*** (1.43) (-1.308) (0.97) (1.15) (3.40) 
No. of firms 101 142 473 158 73 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.37 0.53 0.28 0.56 
Year 2009 2012 2004 2011 2H2005 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for indicated regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on country CGI and control variables for indicated years:  We show results for all 
available years for Brazil and India; and one early, one middle and the last sample year for Korea, Turkey, and Russia.  Country CGI is renormalized sum of 
normalized subindices (mean =0; σ=1).  Control variables are listed in Table 4.  Observations are identified as outliers if a studentized residual from regressing 
ln(Tobin’s q) on CGI > ±1.96.  t-statistics (heteroskedasticity-consistent) are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
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Table 7 
Alternative specifications for firm fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) regressions 
   Brazil India Korea Turkey 
Panel  specification RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
1 Base specification (fromTable 5) 
CGI 0.114*** 0.088 0.064** 0.075** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.050* 
(3.03) (1.15) (2.57) (2.27) (6.26) (5.33) (2.73) (1.88) 
Obs. (firms) 236 (159) 146 (72) 636 (399) 423 (186) 3,285 (669) 3,252 (636) 974 (193) 971 (190) 
R2 0.40 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.52 
2 Common controls 
CGI 0.114*** 0.088 0.068*** 0.083*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.048* 
(3.03) (1.15) (2.68) (2.66) (7.40) (6.26) (2.49) (1.72) 
R2 0.40 0.50 0.35 0.30 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.50 
3 Winsorize controls 
CGI 0.114*** 0.088 0.065*** 0.080** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.063*** 0.048*
(3.03) (1.15) (2.67) (2.42) (6.35) (5.30) (2.62) (1.82)
R2 0.40 0.50 0.35 0.37 0.54 0.40 0.48 0.52
4 Limited control variables 
CGI 0.112*** 0.096 0.080*** 0.086** 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.065** 0.068** 
(2.97) (1.10) (3.15) (2.76) (7.08) (5.43) (2.51) (2.48) 
R2 0.28 0.37 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.38 0.45
5 Very limited controls, similar to Durnev and Kim (2005) 
CGI 0.127*** 0.162*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.077*** 
(4.17) (3.79) (3.12) (2.55) (7.14) (5.51) (2.71) (2.70) 
R2 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.38 0.44 
6 Winsorize ln(Tobin’s q) 
CGI 0.0807* 0.057 0.048 0.015 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.080*** 0.073**
(1.85) (0.66) (1.26) (0.31) (5.01) (3.57) (2.78) (2.30) 
R2 0. 45 0.49 0.24 0.30 0.51 0.36 0.52 0.47 
7 ln(q), neither winsorize nor exclude outliers 
CGI 0.0807* 0.052 0.041 0.003 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.079*** 0.068**
(1.84) (0.60) (0.90) (0.06) (4.41) (2.98) (2.73) (2.09) 
 0.45 0.49 0.23 0.29 0.51 0.35 0.57 0.49 
8 raw Tobin’s q (exclude outliers) 
CGI 0.0929 0.080 0.552 0.199 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.208 0.263 
(1.28) (0.47) (1.33) (0.36) (4.92) (3.84) (1.58) (1.61) 
R2 0.36 0.51 0.14 0.26 0.52 0.35 0.25 0.13 
9 
dep. variable 
ln(market/book); exclude 
outliers 
CGI 0.197*** 0.159 0.096*** 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.056** 0.036 
(3.08) (1.24) (2.60) (2.72) (4.77) (3.69) (1.99) (1.23) 
R2 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.32 0.53 0.59 
Common-2 Index 
CGI 0.0315 0.0208 0.019 -0.005 0.0136** 0.0093 0.003 0.009 
 (1.16) (0.54) (0.63) (-0.12) (2.23) (1.39) (0.14) (0.30) 
R2 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.46 0.51 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for indicated regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on country CGI and control variables.  Sample and country indices are same as in 
Table 5; dependent variable, means of addressing outliers, and control variables (coefficients suppressed) are same as Table 5 except as indicated.  Table 4 
discusses how we winsorize controls.  Limited control variables in Panel 4 are ln(assets; ln(years listed + 1); 3-year sales growth, PPE/sales, R&D/sales, 
exports/sales; 2-digit US SIC industry dummies, and cross-listing dummy.  t-statistics (using firm clusters) in parentheses.  R2 is overall for random effects; 
within for fixed effects.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) in 
boldface. 
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Table 8 
Multicountry Regressions with Pooled CGI, Common-2 Index, and Non-common CGI. 
Dependent variable ln(Tobin’s q), outliers excluded for each country-year 
     Separate Included together Included together 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel     Pooled CGI Common-2 Index 
Common-2 
Index 
Non-common 
CGI 
Common-2 
Index Pooled CGI
1 Cross-sectional OLS (weighted) 
Coefficient 0.083*** 0.036*** 0.016 0.096*** -0.016 0.100*** (4.25) (2.86) (1.10) (3.26) (-0.86) (3.97) 
obs. (firms) 959 841 840 840 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.50 
2 Pooled OLS (weighted) 
Coefficient 0.067*** 0.024** -0.002 0.122*** -0.015 0.075***(5.65) (1.98) (-0.18) (5.81) (-1.03) (5.02) 
obs. (firms) 5,223 (1,422) 4,862 (1,239) 4,856 (1,237) 4,856 (1,237) 
Adj. R2 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 
3 Random effects (unweighted) 
Coefficient 0.067*** 0.015** 0.002 0.092*** -0.014* 0.069***(7.30) (2.04) (0.22) (6.88) (-1.78) (7.01) 
Breusch-Pagan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Median λ 0.715 0.721 0.722 0.723 
Overall R2 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 
4 Fixed effects (weighted)  
Coefficient 0.073*** 0.005 -0.007 0.108*** -0.021 0.073***(4.14) (0.32) (-0.53) (3.04) (-1.52) (3.90) 
 obs. (firms) 4,879 (1,078) 4,609 (986) 4,604 (985) 4,604 (985) 
Within R2 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 
5 Fixed effects, country*year controls 
Coefficient 0.063*** 0.008 -0.001 0.081*** -0.012 0.057***(3.95) (0.55) (-0.04) (2.84) (-0.84) (3.38) 
Within R2 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 
Notes:  Coefficients on governance indices from indicated OLS, random effects (RE), and fixed effects (FE) regressions.  Sample is pooled across countries and 
(except for Panel 1) sample years.  Pooled CGI index uses country CGI values (defined in text) for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey.  Common-2 index is defined 
in text.  Country-level Non-common CGI indices are constructed in same manner as country-CGI, using elements that are not part of Common-2 Index, then 
combined into a multicountry Non-common CGI Index.  All regressions use winsorized common control variables (shown in Table 4); coefficients are 
suppressed.  In Panel 5, we interact each control variable with country dummies.   OLS and RE regressions include industry dummies.  Panel 1 includes country 
dummies; other panels include year*country dummies.  Pooled OLS and FE regressions use country weights = (1/no. of firms); weights are not available with 
RE.  Observations are excluded as outliers if a studentized residual from regressing ln(Tobin’s q) on CGI (within country, year-by-year, for panel data) > ±1.96.  
FE sample excludes firms observed only once.  t-statistics (heteroskedasticity-consistent for cross-sectional OLS; firm clusters otherwise) are in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.  Values for Breusch-
Pagan test are p-values. 
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